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diligence he could not have ascertained that notes were being taken.
There seems to be no exception to this rule, even in a capital case where
the defendant is on trial for his life, as the application of the rule in the
principal case illustrates.
No case was found in which it was held that there is an absolute
right to have the jury take notes, absent a statute to that effect. It is
at most a matter in the sound discretion of the trial court and it is not
error to prohibit note taking.23 "It has never been suggested that the
judge must permit the practice; the question has always been whether
he must forbid it.'"24 At least nine states have enacted statutes which
expressly authorize the jury to take notes in criminal trials.25
While permitting the jury to take notes may not be entirely ad-
vantageous, the argument is well in favor of allowing the practice within
the sound discretion of the trial court. It should not be permitted to
delay or unduly prolong the trial, nor should it be allowed where it
might in some way be prejudicial, but otherwise it would seem to be a
useful and favorable practice.
CLAwsoN L. WILLIAMS, JR.
Trust Investments-Prudent Man Rule
The recent Virginia case of Goodridge v. National Bank of Com-
Imerce1 raised the issue of whether or not a prudent man investment
statute,2 enacted in 1956, was applicable to trusts created prior to the
enactment of the statute. The trusts in question gave authority to the
trustees to make such investments as were authorized "under the
statute laws of the State of Virginia."3 The trustees contended that they
were bound to invest according to the "legal lists" statutes that were
in existence when the trusts were created, because to apply the new
prudent man statute to previously created trusts would be an uncon-
stitutional impairment of the contract obligation owed the settler by the
trustees, and would interfere with the vested rights of the beneficiaries
without due process of law. The Virginia court rejected the above
contentions, holding that the settlor is presumed to have contemplated
that the legislature might change the type of investments allowed fiduci-
" United States v. Campbell, 138 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Iowa 1956).
"United States v. Chiarella, 184 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1950).
" CAL. PEN. CODE § 1137; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2203 (1947); IowA CODE
§ 784.1 (1954); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 631.10 (1947); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.§ 94.7303 (1947); NEv. REV. STAT. § 175.390 (1957); N.Y. CODE CRim. PRoC. §
426; N.D. R.v. CODE § 29-2204 (1943); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-2 (1953).
While these statutes apparently apply only to criminal cases, it is certainly arguable
that they are declarative of the state's policy and apply by analogy to civil cases.
1106 S.E.2d 598 (Va. 1959).
'VA. CODE ANN. § 26-45.1 (Supp. 1958).
S One of the trust indentures omitted the word "statute" and authorized the
trustees to invest according to "the laws of the State of Virginia."
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aries as economic conditions changed, and that consequently, in the
absence of an express provision to the contrary, the settlor is presumed
to have intended that the trustees make such investments as were lawful
and proper under the statutes in effect at the time the investments were
made.4
While this case as a matter of law merely upholds the constitutional-
ity of Virginia's new prudent man statute as applied to trusts created
prior to its enactment, the case has additional significance as another
illustration of the recent tendency of state legislatures to adopt the
prudent man rule for trust investments.
The first introduction of the prudent man rule in this country was
in 1830 by way of the famous Massachusetts case, Harvard College v.
Amory,5 where the basic philosophy of the rule was stated in the follow-
ing words:
All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he conduct
himself faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is to ob-
serve how men of prudence, discretion, and intelligence manage
their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to
the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable
income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be in-
vested.6
The classic divergence from the Massachusetts rule is found in a New
York case, King v. Talbot,7 decided in 1869. While agreeing with the
basic philosophy of the Massachusetts rule, the New York court pro-
hibited the investment of trust funds in stocks. Clearly the Massachu-
setts rule had not contemplated such a prohibition against the invest-
ment of stocks, as the court in Harvard College specifically held that the
trustees were authorized to make investments in the stocks of a manu-
facturing company. Yet the New York rule was to set a precedent
which found expression in case law,8 statutes,9 and even the constitu-
tions10 of states all over the country.
The majority of the states enacted statutes which set out so-called
"legal lists" for fiduciary investments. These "legal lists" statutes, in
the main, followed the New York rule and made no provision for in-
'Accord, Aydelott v. Breeding, 111 Ky. 847, 64 S.W. 916 (1901) ; Mechanicks
Nat'l Bank v. Brady, 100 N.H. 469, 129 A.2d 857 (1957); Fidelity Union Trust
Co. v. Price, 11 N.J. 90, 93 A.2d 321 (1952) ; In re Lincoln Rochester Trust Co.,
201 Misc. 1008, 111 N.Y.S.2d 45 (Surr. Ct. 1952); In re Flynn's Estate, 205
Okla. 311, 237 P.2d 903 (1951) ; Inz re Yate's Will, 259 Wis. 263, 48 N.W.2d 601(1951).
'26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
OId. at 461.
7 40 N.Y. 76 (1869).
' See, e.g., Sellers v. Milford, 101 Ind. App. 590, 198 N.E. 456 (1935).
'See, e.g., GA. CoDE AxN. § 108-417 to -421 (1933), as amended, GA. CoDE
ANN. §§ 108-417, 108-420 (Supp. 1958).
'0 See, e.g., ALA. CONsT. art. 4, § 74.
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vestment in private corporate stocks. Usually the "legal lists" included
only the traditionally conservative trust investments such as govern-
ment bonds, municipal bonds, and first mortgages on land and were either
permissive in that the trustee could go outside the list, if he sustained
the burden of proving reasonable care and skill, or mandatory in that
any investment outside the list would be a breach of trust.'1
This ultra-conservative attitude of the legislature and courts of our
country prevailed during the whole of the nineteenth century; and as
late as 1937, 107 years after the Harvard College case, only six states 12
used the Massachusetts or prudent man rule. Since 1937, however, one
finds an astonishing shift. Today at least 36 states1 3 follow the pru-
dent man rule either in complete or limited form. Thus in the com-
paratively short space of 21 years, 30 states have completely or partially
adopted the rule by judicial decision' 4 or legislative enactment.1
There are several reasons for this sudden change in attitude. Per-
haps first and foremost is that of inflation. It is common knowledge
that we have been and are now experiencing an inflationary trend in our
economy with a corresponding decrease in the purchasing power of the
dollar. In many instances life beneficiaries of trusts set up prior to
World War II are no doubt receiving much less purchasing power than
their benefactors intended. Furthermore the dollar value of the trust
res itself,.if restricted to debt securities, has not increased in accordance
with the general rise in prices. The only remedy for this inflationary
devaluation seems to be equity investment." '
It should be further pointed out that today financial information
about private corporations is more readily available than it was in the
nineteenth century and the marketing of stocks is subject to stringent
regulation. It follows then that the courts and legislatures are now more
inclined to allow investment of fiduciary funds in stocks of corporations
which have acquired a reputation for financial soundness.
North Carolina's position in regard to the prudent man rule is some-
what unusual. It has adopted the prudent man rule by judicial de-
"BoGERT, TRUSTS § 103 (3d ed. 1952).
Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Vermont.
"Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia.
ee, e.g., Rand v. McKittrick, 346 Mo. 466, 142 S.W.2d 29 (1940).
m See, e.g., N.Y. PRS. Parop. LAW § 21 (Supp. 1958) (35% of the trust estate
may be invested under the prudent man rule) ; CAL. Civ. CODE § 2261 (100% of
the trust estate may be invested under the prudent man rule).
"o For a complete discussion of the reasons for the use of stocks in trust in-
vestments, see generally, Torrance, Legal Background, Trends, and Recent Develop-
ments in the Investment of Trust Funds, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 128, 143(1952).
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cision' 7 and in addition maintains a statutory permissive list.18 This
situation has been confusing to legal writers 9 so that it is not illogical
to assume that it has also been confusing to members of the Bar as well
as corporate trustees.
Without expressly adopting it, the North Carolina court as far back
as 1858 seems to have used what might be considered substantially the
prudent man rule. In Washington v. Emery,20 a testamentary trustee
held an unsecured note of a known speculator. The trustee converted
the note into sixty shares of a well-established railroad stock. The
stock had been paying dividends for many years, and the trustee had
consulted competent advisors before investing in the railroad stock. No
loss to the estate had resulted from acquisition of the stock. The court
held that the trustee had acted in good faith and with a reasonable belief
that the fund would be benefited, and that he should be credited with
the value of the stock in his final accounting.
Later where a trustee inyested over 9,000 dollars more than the
court originally authorized in a building, the court approved his invest-
ment saying:
While the utmost degree of good faith is exacted of a trustee,
he is not always held to an assured judgment in the management
of a trust fund or in making an investment; the exercise of the
sound discretion that a prudent man would show in the manage-
ment of his own affairs is usually the approved standard in such
cases.2 1
Although corporate stocks were not involved in this case, under the
circumstances it would seem that the language is broad enough to in-
clude stock investments as well.
Eventually in Sheets v. J. G. Flynt Tobacco Co.,22 the North Caro-
lina court expressly approved the Massachusetts prudent man rule.
Here a guardian invested 9,000 dollars in the preferred stock of a to-
bacco company. The stock subsequently depreciated, and a newly ap-
pointed guardian sued to rescind. A holding for the plaintiffs was re-
"' Sheets v. J. G. Flynt Tobacco Co., 195 N.C. 149, 145 S.E. 355 (1928).1 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36-1 to -6 (1950), as amended, N.C. GEIZ. STAT.. § 36-3
(Supp. 1957).
'" See BOGERT, TRUSTS § 104 nun. 72-4 (3d ed. 1952), where North Carolina was
not included in a list of prudent man states; Torrance, Legal Background, Trends,
and Recent Developments in the Investment of Trust Funds, 17 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 128, 161 (1952), where North Carolina was classified as a permissive list
state; Stevenson, Wh~y the Prudent Man Rule?, 7 VAND. L. REv. 74, 91 (1953),
where North Carolina was classified as a prudent man state.
20 57 N.C. 32 (1858).
21 Fisher v. Fisher, 170 N.C. 378, 382, 87 S.E. 113, 115 (1915). See also State
ex rel Cummings v. Mebane, 63 N.C. 315 at 317 (1869), where very similar
language was used by the court in holding that there was no imprudence in a
guardian accepting Confederate money as payment of, a loan of estate funds.22 195 N.C. 149, 141 S.E. 355 (1928).
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versed on appeal and a new trial ordered, because of the trial court's
refusal to submit the defendant's issues as to the good faith and dili-
gence of the guardian in making the investment. The court said that
if there was any liability it was primarily the guardian's and the prudent
man rule as stated in the Harvard College case was quoted as the
standard to be applied to trust investments.
Even though the court did not decide the question, it would seem
unlikely that the investment in the above case would be a proper one
under the prudent man rule. While there is no information as to how
great a proportion of the trust estate was placed in this particular in-
vestment, the stock was that of a small relatively unknown corporation.
The prudent man rule is not to be interpreted as allowing investment in
such a corporation, nor is an unduly large share of the estate to be placed
in one particular investment. As the Massachusetts court said in the
Appeal of Dickenson :2
[T] rustees in this Commonwealth are permitted to invest portions
of trust funds in dividend paying stocks and interest-bearing
bonds of private business corporations when the corporations have
acquired, by reason of the amount of their property and the
prudent manageiment of their affairs, such a reputation that
cautious and intelligent persons commonly invest their own money
in such stocks and bonds as permanent investments. (Emphasis
added.)
This language emphasizes the high standards a corporation must meet
in order to justify the investment of fiduciary funds in its stock.
The Sheets case seems to be the only North Carolina case expressly
upholding the prudent man rule24 and even then the court did not have
the opportunity to apply it to the facts of the case. Perhaps one of
the reasons for this dearth of case law is the existence of our permissive
list statute2 5 which, like the old New York rule authorizes investment in
traditional government bonds and similar securities, but makes no pro-
152 Mass. 184, 187-88, 25 N.E. 99, 100 (1890).24But see Young v. Hood, 209 N.C. 801, 184 S.E. 823 (1936), where testator
created a trust estate, part of which was bank stock. The number of shares of
stock was increased by a stock dividend and by the trustee's exercise of stock sub-
scription rights. The bank subsequently merged with other banks and the trustee
exchanged the old stock for stock in the new bank which resulted in the trustee
holding its own stock. The new bank failed and in an action to restrain an assess-
ment against the estate on the ground that the trustee acted in bad faith in exer-
cising the stock subscription right, and in exchanging the old stock for the new,
the court found no bad faith and upheld the trustee's action. However this case is
complicated by the fact that the testator suggested in his will that the bank stock
was not to be sold without certain consents unless holding it would, in the opinion
of the trustee, be detrimental. See also Cutter v. American Trust Co., 213 N.C. 686,
197 S.E. 542 (1938), where an original restriction to invest only in government
bonds was removed, and the trustee authorized by the court to invest in stocks and
bonds.
"




vision for investing in private corporate stocks. In a permissive list
state, the general rule is that the trustees may invest according to the
statutory list, or they may invest outside the list providing they use
reasonable skill and prudence.26  It is also a general rule that a trustee
cannot blindly follow the statutory list. He is usually expected to
display reasonable skill and prudence even in making investments which
are provided for by statute.27  Unfortunately North Carolina is not
wholly in accord with this latter rule, and by statute2s insures the
trustee against personal liability if he follows the statutory list.
Consequently, this statute would seem to limit the use of the prudent
man rule in North Carolina. Assuming trustees know the prudent
man rule has been adopted by judicial decision, they may still be
hesitant to follow it when they can enjoy statutory protection. Such a
situation, in these days of inflation could conceivably prove very unfavor-
able to trust beneficiaries. Therefore it is submitted that the North
Carolina legislature would be well-advised in considering statutory en-
actment of the prudent man rule.29  The enactment of the prudent man
rule would clarify the present situation on trust investments; and at
the same time, create an atmosphere less inhibiting on trustees who
presently hesitate to go outside our permissive list.
ALFRED E. CLEVELAND, III
See 3 BoGaRT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 614 (1946) ; 3 ScoT, TRUSTS § 227.13(2d ed. 1956). North Carolina is in accord with this rule. See Sheets v. J. G.
Flynt Tobacco Co., 195 N.C. 149, 154, 141 S.E. 355, 358 (1928).
3 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 26; 3 ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 26.
.- N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36-1, -2, -4 (1950).
"'An illustrative statute embodying the prudent man rule is as follows:
"In investing, reinvesting, purchasing, acquiring, exchanging, selling and man-
aging property for the benefit of another, a trustee shall exercise the judgment and
care, under the circumstances then prevailing, which men of prudence, discretion
and intelligence exercise in the management of their own affairs, not in regard to
speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering
the probable income as well as the probable safety of their capital. Within the
limitations of the foregoing standard, and subject to any express provisions or
limitations contained in any particular trust instrument, a trustee is authorized to
acquire every kind of property, real, personal or mixed, and every kind of invest-
ment, specifically including, but not by way of limitation, corporate obligations of
every kind, and stocks, preferred or common, which men of prudence, discretion
and intelligence acquire for their own account.
"In the absence of express provisions to the contrary in the trust instrument,
a trustee may continue to hold property received into a trust at its inception or.
subsequently added to it or acquired pursuant to proper authority if and as long as:
the trustee, in the exercise of good faith and of reasonable prudence, discretion and-
intelligence, may consider that retention is in the best interests of the trust" CAL.
Civ. CODE § 2261(1), (2).
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